(1969) 1 CLR 167
1969 February 28
[TRIANTAFYLLIDES, LOIZOU & HADJIANASTASSIOU JJ.]
LOIZOS PANAYIDES AS A NATURAL GUARDIAN
OF ANDREAS PANAYIDES PETROU,
Appellant-Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREAS KYRIACOU,
Respondent-Defendant,
(Civil Appeal No. 4692).
Negligence—Contributory negligence—Apportionment of liability—Road accident—Collision between a bicycle and a lorry at crossroad controlled by lights—Appellant proceeded contrary to traffic-lights—Respondent failed to exercise required caution—Apportionment of liability two thirds and one third respectively made by trial Court not disturbed on appeal—Such apportionment was reasonably open to Court of trial—See also herebelow.
Road Traffic—"Traffic-island" at a spot where traffic is controlled by lights not deemed to be a "roundabout" in the sense of bye-law 14(n) of the Nicosia Municipal (Traffic) Bye-laws 1952 to 1956, as now incorporated in the Nicosia Municipal Bye-laws 1965.
Contributory Negligence—Apportionment of liability—See above.
Damages—General damages—Road accident—Negligence—Assessment—Trial Court's assessment sustained by Court of Appeal.
"Roundabout"—Traffic island controlled by traffic lights cannot be deemed to be a roundabout in the sense of bye-law 14(n) of the Nicosia Municipal (Traffic) Bye-laws 1952—1956 as incorporated in the Nicosia Municipal Bye-Laws 1965.
Road Accident—Road traffic—See above.
Traffic Lights—See above.
Words and Phrases—"Roundabout" in bye-law 14(n) of the Nicosia Municipal (Traffic) Bye-laws 1952-1956 as now incorporated in the Nicosia Municipal Bye-Laws 1965—See above.
The facts sufficiently appear in the judgment of the Court.
Appeal.
Appeal by plaintiff against the judgment of the District Court of Nicosia (Mavrommatis & Stylianides D. JJ.) dated the 27th November 1967 (Action No. 4075/65) whereby the defendant was adjudged to pay to him the sum of £265.— as damages for personal injuries he received in a traffic accident.
L. Papaphilippou, for the appellant.
N. Pelides, for the respondent.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by:
TRIANTAFYLLIDES, J.: This is an appeal against the judgment given on the 27th November, 1967, by the Full District Court in Nicosia, in civil action 4075/65; by virtue of this judgment one Andreas Petrou of Nicosia (who has instituted the action through his natural guardian, and is to be referred to hereafter as "the appellant") was awarded £265 general and special damages, on the basis of being to blame, to the extent of two-thirds, for a traffic collision in which he received personal injuries.
The collision occurred on the 14th August, 1965, between a bicycle, which the appellant was riding, and a lorry which was driven by the respondent-defendant, at the junction of Ledra Street with Metaxas Square in Nicosia.
This junction involves, also, Paleologos Avenue, which runs at right angles to Ledra Street, and it is a junction controlled by traffic-lights; at the time, there was in Metaxas Square, at the cross-road of Ledra Street and Paleologos Avenue, a traffic-island, which the trial Court has described in its judgment as a "roundabout".
Regarding the mode of occurrence of the collision the trial Court has relied mostly—and rightly so, in our opinion—on the evidence of a certain Panagros Aristodemou, who had witnessed the collision and was called to give, evidence by the appellant.
The trial Court has found—and this finding is warranted by the evidence of witness Aristodemou—that the respondent drove the lorry across the traffic-lights line, while proceeding towards Ledra Street from Metaxas Square, when the lights were in his favour; the witness was driving in the same direction, behind the lorry, but he had to stop, because the lights, in the meantime, had changed and they were against him; and he remained stopped there, with the lights against him, until the collision took place.
The Court below has found, also, that in all probability the lights were against the appellant when he came out of Ledra Street into Metaxas Square; we do agree with this finding, because the lights showed towards the direction from which the appellant was coming the same colour as towards the direction from which witness Aristodemou was proceeding; and as due, apparently, to the relative distances, the respondent had to drive on for some time (after crossing the line of traffic-lights, and turning around the traffic-island towards Paleologos Avenue) before he came into collision with the appellant, who had just come out of Ledra Street and had not yet started negotiating the traffic-island, it seems that by the time the appellant crossed the line of the traffic-lights on his own side such lights were against him, as they had turned, by then, against witness Aristodemou, too.
Regarding the apportionment of liability, reliance was placed by the trial Court on the fact that the said traffic-island was a "roundabout", in the sense of the relevant Municipal Bye-Laws, and that it was, therefore, the duty of the appellant to give way to traffic on his right, in other words to the respondent.
The relevant provision is sub-paragraph (n) of bye-law 14 of the Nicosia Municipal (Traffic) Bye-Laws 1952-1956, as incorporated in the Nicosia Municipal Bye-Laws 1965.
In our view, however, the traffic-island in question cannot be deemed to be a "roundabout" in the sense of bye-law 14(n); we are of this view because of the fact that the said island could not, in the circumstances, be regarded as intended to serve the purpose of controlling the traffic at the cross-road concerned, once such control was carried out through traffic-lights.
Consequently, bye-law 14(n) cannot be regarded as being relevant to the outcome of this case; and once this is so we need not decide whether or not the submission of counsel for the appellant, to the effect that such bye-law was not validly in force at the material time, is a well-founded one.
The liability of the appellant in relation to the collision in which he was injured has, therefore, to be measured solely on the basis of his having entered the cross-road, at the junction of Ledra Street, Paleologos Avenue and Metaxas Square, contrary to the traffic-lights. As already pointed out earlier in this judgment, that the appellant did so is to be inferred with practical certainty from evidence which he himself has adduced at the hearing before the trial Court; and crossing with the lights against him was one of the two alternative reasons (the aforementioned bye-law 14 (n) being the other) for which the trial Court found the appellant to be at fault, to the extent of two thirds, for the collision.
Coming, next, to the conduct of the respondent, we agree with the trial Court that he was also to blame for the collision, though only to the extent of one-third, in that, while driving at a particularly dangerous spot, he failed to exercise as much caution as he ought to; because had he done so he no doubt would have noticed the appellant earlier and been able to take more effective steps to avoid the collision.
In the light of all the circumstances of this case we are not prepared to interfere with the apportionment of liability as made by the trial Court; such apportionment was reasonably open to it, even if it had not taken into account the alternative factor of the so-called "roundabout".
The next issue with which we have to deal is that of the quantum of damages:
It has been contended by counsel for the appellant that there has been an error in assessing damages in that the trial Court failed to take into account: (a) the pain suffered by the appellant, (b) the possibility of a future operation to remove abdominal adhesions due to the spleenectomy, and (c) the "splenic asthaenia", in other words the after effects of the removal of the spleen, such as headaches and dizziness.
It is quite clear to us, from the record of the case, that the trial Court had ample medical evidence before it in relation to the assessment of damages and, as it is expressly stated in its judgment, such evidence was listened to "very carefully".
Factors (b) and (c), above, were dealt with at length in such evidence and the pain suffered by the appellant was before the trial Court as part and parcel of the whole medical picture.
We have no doubt that the trial Court has duly weighed all relevant considerations in reaching its decision about general damages.
On the whole, and bearing in mind the principles governing the approach of an appellate Court to the question of damages, we have not been satisfied by the appellant that there is anything which can lead to the conclusion that we should interfere with the award of the Court below.
As this appeal cannot be regarded as entirely unjustified, in view of the fact that the element of the roundabout was, as indicated, erroneously brought into the picture by the trial Court, we have decided to make no order as to the costs of the appeal.
In the result this appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed; no
order as to costs.
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