Cylaw

IN RE MANFRED MUTKE (1982) 1 CLR 922

(1982) 1 CLR 922

[*922] 1982 October 30

[TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P.]

IN THE MATTER OF MANFRED MUTKE,

AND

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY HIM FOR

AN ORDER OF HABEAS CORPUS.

(Application No. 13/82).

Fugitive offenders—Extradition—Committal to custory awaiting extradition—No evidence before Committing Judge in the sense of section 9(5) and 13 of the Fugitive Offenders Law, 1970 (Law 97/70)—And no finding by the Judge that there was placed before him such evidence—Such finding an essential part of the decision —Order of committal not made with due compliance with provision of said section 9(5)—Order for habeas corpus made—Section 10 of the above Law and Article 155.4 of the Constitution.

This was an application for an order of habeas corpus after a Judge of the District Court of Limassol committed applicant to custody awaiting his extradition to the Federal Republic of Germany. The Committal was based on section 9 of the Extradition of Fugitive Offenders Law, 1970 (Law 97/70) and the application for an order of habeas corpus was made under section 10 of the same Law.

Regarding the evidence to be heard by the Court of Committal under section 9(5) of the Law the provisions of section 13 of the Law show that such evidence need not be always oral and on oath.

Counsel for the applicant contended that the Court of Committal had no evidence before it on the basis of which there could have been made the committal order challenged by means of an application for an order of habeas corpus. Counsel for the respondent referred the Court to documents forwarded [*923] to the Government of Cyprus when the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany requested the extradition of the applicant, namely an “International warrant for arrest” issued by the Local Court at Osterode am Harz on 19th July 1982 and setting out, in detail, the offences in respect of which the extradition of the applicant is being requested, and, also, a certificate issued by the aforesaid Local Court on 19th July 1982 regarding the relevant provisions of the Get man Criminal Code.

Held, that there is nothing in the documents which were placed before the Court of committal and before this Court which could be regarded as “evidence”, in the sense of sections 9(5) and 13 of Law 97/70, which was adduced in support of the request for the extradition of the applicant and which could be treated as evidence “sufficient to warrant” the applicant’s “trial” for the offences concerned if they “had been committed within the jurisdiction” of the Court of committal; that, further, the Court of committal itself, in its relevant ruling, does not appear to have made a finding that there was placed before it evidence of the aforementioned nature and no such finding has been pointed to this Court in the said ruling by counsel for the respondent; that that finding was an essential part of the decision to commit the applicant to custody to await his extradition and it should have been made clearly and expressly, because this is a matter affecting the liberty of a person; and that, therefore, the order made, as aforesaid, by the District Court of Limassol, was not made with due compliance with the provisions of subsection (5) of section 9 of Law 97/70 and, consequently, an order for habeas corpus, in the exercise of the powers of the Court under section 10 of Law 97/70, as well as under Article 155.4 of the Constitution, has to be made, with the result that the applicant should be discharged from custody.

Application granted.

Application.

Application for an order of habeas corpus by Manfred Mutke following his committal to custody awaiting extradition, by a Judge of the District Court of Limassol.

S. Patsalides with N. Athanatos, for the applicant.

S. Georghiades, Senior Counsel of the Republic with E. Loizidou (Mrs.), for the respondent.

Cur.adv. vult.[*924]

TRIANTAFYLLIDESP. read the following judgment. In the present case the applicant has applied for an order of habeas corpus after a Judge of the District Court of Limassol, on 21st August 1982, committed him to custody to await his extradition to the Federal Republic of Germany.

The committal was, apparently, based on section 9 of the Extradition of Fugitive Offenders Law, 1970 (Law 97/70), and the present application for an order of habeas corpus has been made under section 10 of that Law, which reads as follows:

“10.-(l) Το Δικαστήριον, εν πάση περιπτώσει, καθ' ην ήθελε διατάξει την κράτησιν του υπό έκδοσιν προσώπου δυνάμει του άρθρου 9, θέλει πληροφορήσει άμα τον ενδιαφερόμενον, εις κοινήν γλώσσαν, περί του δικαιώματος αυτού όπως υποβάλη αίτησιν δια habeas corpus προς τούτοις δε αμελλητί κοινοποιήση την τοιαύτην απόφασιν τω Υπουργώ.

(2) Πρόσωπον, ούτινος διετάχθη η κράτησις δυνάμει του ως είρηται άρθρου 9 δεν δύναται δυνάμει του παρόντος Νόμου να αποδοθή εις το Κράτος ή την χώραν, ήτις ητήσατο την έκδοσιν αυτού-

(α) εν πάση περιπτώσει, μέχρις ου παρέλθη διάστημα δεκαπέντε ημερών από της ημέρας, καθ' ην εξεδόθη το περί εκδόσεως διάταγμα·

(β) εν η περιπτώσει ήθελεν υποβληθή αίτησις δια habeas corpus εφ' όσον εκκρεμεί η εξέτασις της υποβληθείσης αιτήσεως.

(3) Το Ανώτατον Δικαστήριον, επιλαμβανόμενον της τοιαύτης αιτήσεως, δύναται, μη επηρεαζομένης οιασδήποτε ετέρας δικαιοδοσίας αυτού, να διατάξη την αποφυλάκισιν του υπό έκδοσιν προσώπου, εφ' όσον ήθελε κρίνει ότι-

(α) λόγω της ασημάντου φύσεως του αδικήματος, δι' ο διώκεται ή κατεδικάσθη· ή

(β) λόγω της παρόδου μακρού χρόνου, αφ' ου εγένετο η διάπραξις του αδικήματος, ή αναλόγως της περιπτώσεως, αφ' ου καταζητείται προς έκτισιν ποινής μετά καταδίκην αυτού· ή

(γ) λόγω του ότι η κατ' αυτού κατηγορία δεν εγένετο καλή τη πίστει ή εν τω συμφέροντι της δικαιοσύνης, [*925] η απόδοσις αυτού θα απετέλει, λαμβανομένων υπ' όψιν απασών των περιστάσεων, άδικον ή καταπιεστικόν μέτρον.

(4) Το Ανώτατον Δικαστήριον, επιλαμβανόμενον οιασδήποτε τοιαύτης αιτήσεως, δύναται να δεχθή συμπληρωματικά αποδεικτικά στοιχεία, σχετικά προς την άσκησιν της δικαιοδοσίας αυτού δυνάμει του άρθρου 4 ή δυνάμει του εδαφίου (3) του παρόντος άρθρου.

(5) Διά τους σκοπούς του παρόντος άρθρου, η διαδικασία διά την εξέτασιν αιτήσεως υποβληθείσης διά την έκδοσιν habeas corpus λογίζεται εκκρεμούσα μέχρις ου εκδικασθή η κατ' αυτής τυχόν ασκηθείσα έφεσις, ή παρέλθη άπρακτος η προθεσμία, εν η δύναται να ασκηθή τοιαύτη έφεσις, ή, εφ' όσον απαιτείται άδεια διά την άσκησιν εφέσεως, η προθεσμία εν ή δύναται να αιτηθή η παροχή της τοιαύτης αδείας”.

(10.-(1) Where a person is committed to custody under section 9, the Court shall inform him in ordinary language of his right to make an application for habeas corpus and shall forthwith give notice of the committal to the Minister.

(2) A person committed to custody under the said section 9 shall not be returned under this Law -

(a) in any case, until the expiration of the period of fifteen days beginning with the day on which the order for his committal is made;

(b) if an application for habeas corpus is made in his case, so long as proceedings on that application are pending.

(3) On any such application the Supreme Court may, without prejudice to any other jurisdiction of the Court, order the person committed to be discharged from custody if it appears to the Court that -

(a) by reason of the trivial nature of the offence of which he is accused or was convicted; or

(b) by reason of the passage of time since he is alleged to have committed it or to have become unlawfully at large, as the case may be; or [*926]

it would, having regard to all the circumstances, be unjust or oppressive to return him.

(4) On any such application the Supreme Court may receive additional evidence relevant to the exercise of their jurisdiction under section 4 or under subsection (3) of this section.

(5) For the purposes of this section proceedings on an application for habeas corpus shall be treated as pending until any appeal in those proceedings is disposed of; and an appeal shall be treated as disposed of at the expiration of the time within which the appeal may be brought or, where leave to appeal is required, within which the application for leave may be made, if the appeal is not brought or the application made within that time.”)

Counsel for the respondent has pointed out that in subsection (4) of section 10, above, the reference to “section 4” should have been a reference to “section 6” of Law 97/70.

Law 97/70 has been preceded by the European Convention on Extradition (Ratification) Law, 1970 (Law 95/70), but I do not think that there arises, at any rate for the purposes of this case, the issue of whether Law 95/70 and the Convention which was ratified by means of it, are, in any way, in conflict with the relevant provisions of Law 97/70 because in the said Convention it is expressly provided, by means of its Article 22, that “Except where this Convention otherwise provides, the procedure with regard to extradition and provisional arrest shall be governed solely by the law of the requested Party.”

In deciding on the fate of this application for an order of habeas corpus I have to examine, inter alia, whether the procedure prescribed by Law 97/70 has been duly complied with.

It is provided, by means of subsection (5) of section 9 of Law 97/70, as follows:

“(5) Εφ' όσον η εξουσιοδότησις διά την έναρξιν της διαδικασίας της εκδόσεως ήθελε παρασχεθή το δε επιληφθέν [*927] της εκδόσεως Δικαστηρίου ήθελεν ικανοποιηθή, δυνάμει των προσαχθέντων προς υποστήριξιν της αιτήσεως εκδόσεως αποδεικτικών στοιχείων, ή των κατ' αυτής προσαχθέντων τοιούτων, ότι το αδίκημα εις ο αφορά η τοιαύτη εξουσιοδότησις είναι αδίκημα δι' ο δύναται κατά νόμον να χωρήση έκδοσις, προς τούτοις δε ικανοποιηθή—

(α) εν μεν τη περιπτώσει προσώπου διωκομένου διά την διάπραξιν του εν λόγω αδικήματος, ότι τα προσαχθέντα ενώπιον αυτού αποδεικτικά στοιχεία είναι επαρκή ώστε να δικαιολογώσι την παραπομπήν αυτού εις δίκην διά το εν λόγω αδίκημα, εφ' όσον τούτο διεπράττετο εντός της δικαιοδοσίας του Δικαστηρίου·

(β) εν δε τη περιπτώσει προσώπου καταζητουμένου διά την έκτισιν ποινής επιβληθείσης αυτώ διά την διάπραξιν του τοιούτου αδικήματος, ότι τω όντι κατεδικάσθη και ότι παρανόμως παραμένει ελεύθερον,

το Δικαστήριον θέλει διατάξει την προφυλάκισιν αυτού μέχρις ου χωρήση η έκδοσις, εκτός εάν η έκδοσις απαγορεύεται δυνάμει ετέρας τινός προνοίας του παρόντος Νόμου· εν εναντία περιπτώσει θέλει διατάξει όπως το εις ό αφορά η αίτησις εκδόσεως πρόσωπον αφεθή ελεύθερον”.

(“(5) Where an authority to proceed has been issued in respect of the pen on arrested and the Court of committal is satisfied, after hearing any evidence tendered in support of the request for the extradition of that person or on behalf of that person, that the offence to which the authority relates is an extradition offence and is further satisfied-

(a)where that person is accused of the offence, that the evidence would be sufficient to warrant his trial for that offence if it had been committed within the jurisdiction of the Court;

(b) where that person is alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction of the offence, that he has been so convicted and appears to be so at large,

the Court shall, unless his committal is prohibited by any other provision of this Law, commit him to custody to await his extradition thereunder; but if the Court is not [*928]so satisfied or if the committal of that person is so prohibited, the Court shall discharge him from custody.”).

As regards the “evidence”, to which reference is made in the aforementioned subsection (5), there should be borne in mind the provisions of section 13 of Law 97/70, which show, in my opinion, that the evidence to be adduced before the “Court of committal” - in this case the District Court of Limassol - need not be always oral and on oath.

The said section 13 reads as follows:

“(13.-(1) Εις πάσαν διαδικασίαν διεξαγομένην δυνάμει του παρόντος Νόμου, περιλαμβανομένης και της διαδικασίας της αφορώσης εις την αίτησιν εκδόσεως habeas corpus, αναφορικώς προς κρατούμενον, δυνάμει του παρόντος Νόμου, πρόσωπον—

(α) παν, δεόντως κεκυρωμένον, έγγραφον, φερόμενον ως περιέχον ένορκον μαρτυρικήν κατάθεσιν παρασχεθείσαν εις Κράτος συνάψαν συνθήκην εκδόσεως μετά της Δημοκρατίας ή εις καθωρισμένην Χώραν της Κοινοπολιτείας, γίνεται αποδεκτόν ως αποδεικτικόν στοιχείον των εν αυτώ εκτιθεμένων γεγονότων·

(β) παν, δεόντως κεκυρωμένον έγγραφον, φερόμενον ως έγγραφον αποδεικτικόν στοιχείον ή ως αντίγραφον τοιούτου εγγράφου κατατεθέντος εις οιανδήποτε δικαστικήν διαδικασίαν διεξαχθείσαν εις το τοιούτον Κράτος ή χώραν, γίνεται αποδεκτόν ως αποδεικτικόν στοιχείον·

(γ) παν, δεόντως κεκυρωμένον έγγραφον, πιστοποιούν ότι πρόσωπον τι κατεδικάσθη κατά την καθωρισμένην εν τω εγγράφω ημερομηνίαν, δι' αδίκημα κατά το δίκαιον οιουδήποτε τοιούτου Κράτους ή χώρας ή τμήματος αυτών, γίνεται δεκτόν ως αποδεικτικόν στοιχείον του γεγονότος και της ημερομηνίας της τοιαύτης καταδίκης.

(2) Διά τους σκοπούς του παρόντος άρθρου έγγραφον τι λογίζεται ως δεόντως κεκυρωμένον τοιούτο—

(α) εν τη περιπτώσει εγγράφου περιέχοντος μαρτυρικήν κατάθεσιν παρασχεθείσαν ως εν τοις ανωτέρω, εφ' όσον ήθελε πιστοποιηθή υπό δικαστού ή λειτουργού του ως είρηται Κράτους ή χώρας ότι τούτο είναι το [*929] πρωτότυπον έγγραφον, το περιέχον ή αναγράφον την τοιαύτην μαρτυρικήν κατάθεσιν ή πιστόν αντίγραφον αυτού·

(β) εν τη περιπτώσει εγγράφου αποδεικτικού στοιχείου, εφ' όσον ήθελε πιστοποιηθή ως εν τοις ανωτέρω ότι είναι το πρωτότυπον του ούτω κατατεθέντος εγγράφου ή πιστόν αντίγραφον αυτού·

(γ) εν τη περιπτώσει εγγράφου βεβαιούντος την καταδίκην προσώπου, εφ' όσον τούτο ήθελε πιστοποιηθή ως εν τοις ανωτέρω,

και εν πάση τοιαύτη περιπτώσει το έγγραφον κυρούται είτε δι' ενόρκου τινός μαρτυρίας είτε διά της επισήμου σφραγίδος Υπουργού του Κράτους μεθ' ου συνήφθη συνθήκη εκδόσεως μετά της Δημοκρατίας, ή, αναλόγως της περιπτώσεως, καθωρισμένης χώρας της Κοινοπολιτείας.

(3) Εν τω παρόντι άρθρω ο όρος ένορκος περιλαμβάνει και επίσημον βεβαίωσιν ή δήλωσιν· ουδέν των εν τω παρόντι άρθρω διαλαμβανομένων αποκλείει την παραδοχήν οιουδήποτε εγγράφου ως αποδεικτικού στοιχείου, εφ' όσον το τοιούτον έγγραφον είναι παραδεκτόν ως αποδεικτικόν στοιχείον ανεξαρτήτως των προνοιών του παρόντος άρθρου.”

(“13)-(1)In any proceedings under this Law, including proceedings on an application for habeas corpus in respect of a person in custody thereunder -

(a) a document, duly authenticated, which purports to set out evidence given on oath in a treaty State or designated commonwealth country shall be admissible as evidence of the matters stated therein;

(b) a document, duly authenticated, which purports to have been received in evidence, or to be a copy of a document so received, in any proceedings in any such State or country ehall be admissible in evidence;

(c) a document, duly authenticated, which certifies that a person was convicted on a date specified in the document of an offence against the law of, or of a part of, any such State or country ihall be admissible as evidence of the fact and date of the conviction. [*930]

(2) A document shall be deemed to be duly authenticated for the purposes of this section -

(a) in the case of a document purporting to set out evidence given as aforesaid, if the document purports to be certified by a judge, or magistrate or officer in or of the State or country in question to be the original document containing or recording that evidence or a true copy of such a document;

(b) in the case of a document which purports to have been received in evidence as aforesaid or to be a copy of a document so received, if the document purports to be ceitified as aforesaid to have been, or to be a true copy of a document which has been, so received;

(c) in the case of a document which certifies that a person was convicted as aforesaid, if the document purports to be certified as aforesaid,

and in any such case the document is authenticated either by the oath of a witness or by the official seal of a Minister of the treaty State or the designated commonwealth country, as the case may be.

(3) In this section ‘oath’ includes affirmation or declaration; and nothing in this section shall prejudice the admission in evidence of any document which is admissible in evidence apart from this section.”).

Sections 9, 10 and 13, above, of our Law 97/70 appear to have been modelled on, respectively, sections 7, 8 and 11 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967, in England (see Halsbury’s Statutes of England, 3rd ed., vol. 13, p. 286).

It has been submitted by counsel for the applicant that the Court of committal had no evidence before it on the basis of which there could have been made the committal order which is now challenged by means of an application for an order of habeas corpus. On the other hand, I have been referred by counsel for the respondent to documents forwarded to the Government of Cyprus when the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany requested the extradition of the applicant, namely an “International warrant for arrest” issued by the [*931]Local Court at Osterodeam Harz on 19th July 1982 and setting out, in detail, the offences in respect of which the extradition of the applicant is being requested, and, also, a certificate issued by the aforesaid Local Court on 19th July 1982 regarding the relevant provisions of the German Criminal Code.

As far as I can see there is nothing in the documents which were placed before the Court of committal and before me which could be regarded as “evidence”, in the sense of sections 9(5) and 13 of Law 97/70, which was adduced in support of the request for the extradition of the applicant and which could be treated as evidence “sufficient to warrant” the applicant’s “trial” for the offences concerned if they “had been committed within the jurisdiction” of the Court of committal.

It has to be noted, further, that the Court of committal itself, in its relevant ruling, does not appear to have made a finding that there was placed before it evidence of the aforementioned nature and no such finding has been pointed to me in the said ruling by counsel for the respondent. That finding was an essential part of the decision to commit the applicant to custody to await his extradition and it should have been made clearly and expressly, because this is a matter affecting the liberty of a person.

For these reasons I find that the order made, as aforesaid, by the District Court of Limassol, was not made with due compliance with the provisions of subsection (5) of section 9 of Law 97/70 and, consequently, an order for habeas corpus, in the exercise of the powers of the Court under section 10 of Law 97/70, as well as under Article 155.4 of the Constitution, has to be made, with the result that the applicant should be discharged from custody.

As no costs have been claimed by counsel for the applicant I do not propose to make any order regarding the costs of the present proceedings.

Application granted. No order

as to costs.

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