(1970) 3 CLR 176
1970 June 23
[*176]
[VASSILIADES, P., TRIANTAFYLLIDES, JOSEPHIDES,
STAVRINIDES, HADJIANASTASSIOU, JJ.]
PANTELAKIS Z. KYPRIANIDES,
Appellant,
and
THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THROUGH
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
Respondent.
(Revisional Jurisdiction Appeal No. 50).
Public officers-Promotion-Decision regarding effective date of Applicant’s promotion-Recourse-Unsuccessful-Appeal against dismissal of the recourse-Appeal dismissed-Respondent Public Service Commission having given due regard to all material factors-Therefore, it has neither failed to excercise properly its discretionary powers nor did it act in excess or abuse of its discretionary powers-Article 125 of the Constitution.
Public officers-In the public service on the date immediately preceding the coming into operation of the Constitution (August 16, 1960)-Rights safeguarded under Article 192.1 of the Constitution-But provisions thereof do not apply to a public officer holding post at the material time in an acting capacity.
Colonial Regulations-Construction of Colonial Regulations 33, 34, 35 and 36.
Costs-Order for costs against unsuccessful Applicant-Set aside on appeal because of the long time taken by the successful Respondent to decide on Applicant’s promotion.
Cases referred to:
Contopoullos and The Republic, 1964 C.L.R. 347, at pp. 352, 353.
The facts of this case sufficiently appear in the judgment of the Supreme Court, dismissing the appeal by the Applicant against the decision of a single Judge of this Court dismissing the recourse under Article 146 of the Constitution made by the Applicant complaining against a decision of the Respondent [*177]
Public Service Commission regarding the effective date of his promotion to the post of Lands officer, in the Department of Lands and Surveys. (See the judgment appealed from in (1968) 3 C.L.R. 653).
Appeal.
Appeal against the judgment of a Judge of the Supreme Court of Cyprus (Loizou, J.) given on the 22nd November 1968, (Revisional Jurisdiction Case No. 251/66) dismissing a recourse against a decision relating to the effective date of the Appellant’s promotion to the post of Lands officer in the Department of Lands and Surveys.
G. Cacoyiannis, for the Appellant.
A. Frangos, Senior Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
VASSILIADES, P.: Mr. Justice Hadjianastassiou will deliver the first judgment.
HADJIANASTASSIOU, J.: This is an appeal by the Appellant against the decision of a single Judge of this Court, dated November 28, 1968, declaring that having regard to the circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that it was not reasonably open to the Public Service Commission to reach the decision complained of. The Appellant appealed to this Court upon various grounds.
The facts in this case are not in dispute and are as follows:-
The Applicant, who was a Lands Clerk, was serving in Limassol, when his superior, Mr. Savvides, went on leave on December 4, 1958, prior to his retirement on February 26, 1959. The Applicant was instructed to perform the duties of Director of the Lands office in Limassol as from that date, i.e. December 4, 1958.
On December 18, 1958, his acting appointment was published in the official Gazette w.e.f. December 4, 1958, as a Lands officer, Class II. He continued serving in that capacity, until May, 1963, when he was promoted to the post of Lands officer [*178] in the Department of Lands and Surveys w.e.f. January 1, 1963. The Applicant accepted the appointment, but he reserved his right to challenge the date of his promotion only. On August 31, 1963, the Applicant filed recourse No. 132/63 and by the judgment of the trial Court, the decision of the Public Service Commission as to the date of the Applicant’s promotion was annulled, because the Commission acted under a preconceived policy in not making a retrospective promotion of the Applicant.
On July 5, 1966, the Public Service Commission, following the judgment of the Court, dealt with the question of the promotion of the Applicant, and an extract from the minutes of the meeting reads as follows:-
“Two vacancies in the post of Lands officer occurred on 26.2.59 and 1.10.59 respectively. If the vacancy in the post of Lands officer, Limassol, were to be filled at that time, there were two other Land Clerks, 1st Grade, viz. Messrs. G. S. Contopoullos and P. Poetis (who retired as from 1.12.62 and 1.10. 60 respectively) who would have had stronger claims for promotion to that vacancy than Mr. Kyprianides, being fully qualified, more senior and with better reports and service records than Mr. Kyprianides. During the interviews of 23.2.62 for the filling of the post of Lands officer, Mr. Contopoullos was found to have stronger claims for promotion to that post than Mr. Kyprianides. The existing vacancies were not then filled, however, because of the impending reorganization of the Department of Lands and Surveys and at the request of the Ministry of Interior.
Having regard to the foregoing the Commission came to the conclusion that there was no reason why Mr. Kyprianides’ promotion to the post of Lands officer should be made effective from any time prior to February, 1962, when the vacancies would have been filled on or shortly after 23.2.62 when the interviews were held, had it not been for the impending reorganization of the Department, the Commission decided unanimously that on promotion to the post of Lands officer w.e.f. 1.1.63, Mr. Kyprianides be granted one increment above the initial of the salary scale of the post, subject to the agreement of the Minister of Finance.” [*179]
In October 1966 the Applicant, feeling aggrieved once again because of the decision of the Public Service Commission, filed recourse No. 251/66 claiming the following relief:-A declaration that the decision of the Respondent communicated to the Applicant, by its letter to him dated 1st August, 1966 and received by the Applicant on 9th August, 1966, to the effect that the effective date of the Applicant’s promotion to the post of Lands officer, in the Department of Lands and Surveys, shall remain the 1st January, 1963, in spite of the of the Supreme Court in recourse No. 132/63, but that in the light of such judgment the Applicant was granted one increment above the initial of his salary scale, is null and void and of no effect whatsoever and as being contrary to the provisions of the Constitution or contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in the said recourse No. 132/63 and/or as having been made in excess and/or in abuse of powers.
According to the opposition filed by the Respondent on December 24, 1966, the vacant posts in the Department of Lands and Surveys were to be filled early in 1962 and on the 23rd February, 1962, interviews were actually held for the filling of vacancies including the vacant post of Lands officer in Limassol. At the aforesaid interviews, Mr. G. S. Kontopoullos was found to be better qualified and more suited than the Applicant for the filling of the vacant post of Lands officer. The vacant posts were not filled in 1962 owing to the impending re-organization in the Department. The earliest date as from which an appointment to the post of Lands officer in Limassol could be made was the 1st January, 1962.
On November 22, 1968, the trial Court, after dismissing the application of the Applicant, had this, inter alia, to say (1968) 3 C.L.R. 653 at pp. 660-661:-
“With regard to the two particular grounds as a result of which the original decision was annulled, i.e. the question of increments and that of the retrospective promotion, it is quite clear both from the minutes of the meeting at which the decision complained of was taken (exhibit 1) and the letter by means of which the decision was communicated to the Applicant (exhibit 8) that the Commission paid due regard to both these matters before taking their new decision.
It has been stated time and again and it. is hardly necessary to repeat it that this Court will not interfere [*180] with a decision of the Commission by substituting its own discretion for that of the Commission, and so long as a decision of the Commission was reasonably open to it, on the material before it, the Court will confirm that decision, even if in exercising its own discretion on the merits it could have reached a different conclusion.”
Counsel on behalf of the Appellant has mainly contended that the Respondent had failed to consider the particular merits of Applicant’s claim to a retrospective promotion.
With great respect to counsel’s argument, I find myself unable to agree with him, because it appears that this matter was considered by the Public Service Commission and reasons were given in the minutes dated July 5, 1966, (exhibit 1). Furthermore, it is clear from the letter (exhibit 8) addressed by the Commission to the Applicant, that he was granted one increment above the initial salary of the scale of the post of Lands officer, as from the date of his promotion, thus minimising in effect the decision not to promote the Applicant restrospectively as from January 1, 1962, which, as counsel for the Respondent alleged, was the earliest date a promotion could be made. I would, therefore, dismiss this contention of counsel.
As regards the contention of counsel that the Public Service Commission exercised its discretion wrongly, because they failed to take into account all relevant factors before them and to direct their mind to the correct. or proper criteria, I would state that I find myself in agreement with the trial Judge that the Commission, having given regard to all the relevant material before it in the case in hand, has neither failed to exercise rightly its discretionary power under Article 125 of the Constitution in promoting the Applicant as from January 1, 1963, nor did it act in excess or abuse of its discretionary power. I would, therefore, dismiss also this contention of counsel.
The next complaint of counsel is that the learned trial Judge has, failed to consider in his judgment his submission that the decision of the Respondent was contrary to paragraph 1 of Article 192 of the Constitution, and the Colonial Regulations 33 and 34.
I have had occasion to consider paragraph. 1 of Article 192, and I have reached the view that these provisions do not cover [*181] the case of the Applicant, because he was holding the post of Lands officer prior to the coming into force of the Constitution, in an acting capacity only. In fairness, however, to counsel, he has also conceded in argument that he had never put forward the suggestion that-the Applicant had a vested right to promotion because he was acting in that capacity.
As regards the effect of Colonial Regulations 33 and 34, in construing them, we should read them in conjunction with Colonial Regulations 35 and 36. When they are so read, it abundantly clear that Colonial Regulations 33 and 34 regulate the question of the payment to, a public officer, who is acting in a vacant office, of the “salary” if available, of such vacant office, and that the said regulations do not confer a right on a public officer to retrospective promotion in the circumstances of this case.
Finally, counsel has contended that the decision of the Public Service Commission was discriminating and, as such, was contrary to Article 28 of the Constitution.
I am in agreement with counsel that the Commission possibly did not deal with the appointments and promotions of each department at the same time; but, nevertheless, in view of the pending re-organization of the Lands, and Surveys Department, the delay, in my view, was not of such a nature as to create discrimination against the Applicant. In any event, it is clear that the Commission, in effecting the promotion of the Applicant and being fully conversant with all the facts of the case, granted an increment to the Applicant retrospectively.
For the reasons I have endeavoured to explain, I am of the view, that the decision of the Respondent is not contrary to any of the provisions of the Constitution or of any law, nor is it made in excess or in abuse of powers. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the learned trial Judge and dismiss the appeal.
With regard to the question of costs, I am inclined to agree with counsel for the Appellant that the trial Court has erred in awarding costs in favour of the Respondent, because of the long time the Commission took to decide the promotion of the Appellant. I would, therefore, set aside the order of the trial Court for costs and make no order as to costs in this appeal. Cf. George S. Contopoullos and The Republic of Cyprus [*182] through The Public Service Commission, 1964 C.L.R. 347 at pp.352 and 353.
VASSILIADES, P.: I agree that the recourse fails; and that it was rightly dismissed by the learned trial Judge for the reasons stated in his judgment. I would dismiss the appeal.
I also agree that in the circumstances of this case, there should be no order for costs against the Applicant in the recourse throughout; and I would vary the trial Judge’s order accordingly.
TRIANTAFYLLIDES, J.: I agree, too, with the outcome of this appeal; as well as with the order for costs already proposed.
I must say, however, that I did not feel entirely happy with the weight given by the Public Service Commission to the situation regarding promotions in February, 1962, which actually never materialized; but, having given the matter my anxious consideration, I did not reach the conclusion-that such situation was an extraneous factor or that so very disproportionate weight was given to it as to make me take the view that on this ground the sub judice decision of the Commission should have been annulled.
JOSEPHIDES, J.: I agree and have nothing to add.
STAVRINIDES, J.: Whether the. Appellant’s promotion should have been made retrospectively, and if so as from what date, and whether he should have been granted any increment were matters within the discretion of the Public Service Commission, and no reason has been shown why the exercise of that discretion should be interfered with. On this ground I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. I also agree that no order should be made regarding the costs of the appeal.
VASSILIADES, P.: In the result this appeal is dismissed, subject to the trial Judge’s order as to costs being set aside; and we make no order as to costs in this appeal.
Appeal dismissed. No order as
to costs of the appeal. Trial
Judge’s order as to costs set
aside.
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