(1981) 3 CLR 555

 

[*555] 1981 December 23

 

[DEMETRIADES, J.]

IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 146 OF THE CONSTITUTION

ARGYROS KYRIACOU,

Applicant,

v.

THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THROUGH

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,

Respondent.

(Case No. 9/80).

Administrative law-Executory act-Meaning-Confirmatory act-Cannot be made the subject of a recourse under Article 146 of the Constitution-Public Officer-Interdiction pending inquiry into commission of disciplinary offences-No recourse against interdiction-Twenty-six disciplinary charges preferred against applicant-Applicant applying for termination of interdiction following withdrawal of ten of the charges-Decision turning down his application a confirmatory of the previous decision to interdict him and cannot be made the subject of a recourse under the above Article.

The applicant was a permanent member of the Public Service of the Republic holding the post of Lay Worker in the Department of Medical Services and was posted at St. Charalambos Home for the Disabled at Larnaca. The Director-General Ministry of Health having received complaints that applicant may have committed disciplinary offences by letter dated 21.2.1978 informed the Public Service Commission that the Minister of Health ordered an inquiry into the Commission of such offences, and submitted, by relying on sections 80 and 84 of the Public Service Law, 1967 (Law 33/67) that applicant should in the public interest, be interdicted until the final determination of the case.

The Public Service Commission met on February 22,[*556]1978 and decided to interdict applicant. This decision was communicated to applicant on the same day but he filed no recourse against it.

Finally there were preferred against, applicant 26 disciplinary charges and the hearing of the proceedings started on the 18th September, 1979. On the 24th September, 1979, the applicant was acquitted on charges 17 to 26 after leave was granted to counsel appearing for the Prosecuting Authority to withdraw same.

On the 5th October, 1979, counsel representing the applicant addressed a letter to the Public Service Commission asking on his behalf that, because of his acquittal on the said 10 charges, and as he believed that the reasons for which his client had been interdicted had ceased to exist, his interdiction ought to be terminated immediately.

The Public Service Commission met on the 24th October, 1979, and after taking into consideration applicant’s counsel letter and an advice of the Deputy Attorney-General on the matter, reached the conclusion not to terminate his interdiction before the final determination of the case. This decision was communicated to counsel for the applicant by letter dated the 31st October, 1979 and is the subject of this recourse.

Counsel for the respondent contended that the sub judice decision was not of an executory nature but a confirmatory of the previous decision to interdict applicant and as such it could not be challenged by a recourse.

Counsel for the applicant submitted that it is not the decision to interdict him that is challenged by this recourse, but the failure of the respondents to recognise that the applicant’s interdiction came to an end, in view of the developments which supervened during the disciplinary proceedings, namely the acquittal of the applicant on 10 out of the 26 charges preferred against him.

Held, that not every act emanating from an administrative organ can be made the subject of a recourse, but only those which are of an executory nature; that the main element of the concept of an executory act is the direct production of a legal situation concerning the subject and entailing its direct execution[*557]by administrative means; that the remaining 16 charges pending then against applicant were for offences which are considered to be not only of a nature unbecoming for a civil servant, but, also, punishable by the Criminal Code, i.e. insults, assaults, unlawful possession of firearms and offences against public order; that these charges formed part of the original complaint of the Director-General of the Ministry of Health on which the Public Service Commission based its decision for the interdiction of the applicant; that, therefore, the decision of the Commission, after the letter of counsel for the applicant, not to terminate his interdiction, was not based on any new facts before it, and for this reason, such decision can only be held to be a confirmatory and not an executory act and as such it cannot be made the subject of a recourse (see Economides v. The Republic (1980) 3 C.L.R. 219 at pp. 223, 224); accordingly the recourse must fail.

Application dismissed.

Cases referred to:

Economides v.The Republic (1980) 3 C.L.R. 219 at pp. 223, 224.

Recourse.

Recourse against the refusal of the respondent to terminate applicant’s interdiction.

C. L. Clerides, for the applicant.

A. Papasavvas, Counsel of the Republic, for the respondent.

Cur.adv. vult.

DEMETRIADES J. read the following judgment. By the present recourse the applicant prays for a declaration that the act and/or decision of the respondents, which was communicated to his counsel by letter dated 31st October, 1979, not to terminate the interdiction imposed on him on the 22nd February, 1978, is null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

The applicant was a permanent member of the Civil Service of the Republic. He held the post of Lay Worker in the Department of Medical Services and was posted at St. Charalambos’ Home for the Disabled, at Larnaca.

As a result of a number of complaints made to the Ministry of Health by inmates of the said Home against the applicant,[*558]and which complaints related to assaults, indecent assaults committed against female labourers of the Home, as well as to uttering insulting words against the person of the late President of the Republic, the Director General of the Ministry of Health informed in writing, on the 21st February, 1978, the President of the Public Service Commission that the Minister of Health had ordered an inquiry into the commission of disciplinary offences by him and submitted that, in view of the seriousness of the complaints and the fact that the applicant was in charge of the personnel of the Home, ho should, in the public interest, be interdicted until the final determination of the case.

The relevant legislative provisions on which the General Director of the Ministry of Health had based his above submission are sections 80 and 84 of the Public Service Law, 1967 (Law 33/67), which read as follows :-

“S.80 If it is reported to the appropriate authority concerned that a public officer may have committed a disciplinary offence the appropriate authority shall forthwith-

(a) if the offence is one of those specified in Part I of the First Schedule, cause a departmental inquiry to be made in such manner as the appropriate authority may direct and proceed as provided in section 81:

Provided that, if the appropriate authority is of opinion that, owing to the seriousness of the offence or the circumstances under which it was committed, it should entail a more serious punishment, it may refer the matter to the Commission, in which case it shall proceed under paragraph (b);

(b) in any other case, cause an investigation to be made in the prescribed manner and then proceed as provided in section 82.

Provided that until Regulations are made prescribing the manner of investigation, the Regulations set out in Part I of the Second Schedule apply”.

“S.84 (1) When an investigation of a disciplinary offence is directed under the provisions of paragraph (b) of section 80 against an officer or on the commencement of a police investigation with the object of criminal proceedings against[*559]him, the Commission may, if public interest so requires, interdict the officer from duty pending the investigation and until the final, disposal of the case.

(2) Notice of such interdiction shall be given in writing to the officer as soon as possible and thereupon the powers, privileges and benefits vested in the officer shall remain in abeyance during the period the interdiction continues:

Provided that the Commission shall allow the officer to receive such portion of the emoluments of his office, not being less than one half, as the Commission may think fit.

(3) If the officer is acquitted or if as a result of the investigation there is no case against him, the interdiction shall come to an end and the officer shall be entitled to the full amount of the emoluments which he would have received if he had not been interdicted. If he is found guilty and the punishment is other than dismissal, the officer may be refunded such portion of his emoluments as the Commission may think fit if the punishment imposed on the officer is dismissal, the officer shall receive no emoluments in respect of the period from the date of his conviction to the date of his dismissal”.

Acting on the aforesaid information, the Public Service Commission, at its meeting dated the 22nd February, 1978, decided to interdict the applicant. Such decision appears in Appendix 3 attached to the Opposition in this recourse and reads as follows:-

“The Director-General, Ministry of Health, by his letter No. Y.Y.407/61/8 of 21.2.1978, informed the Commission that an investigation has been directed with a view to instituting disciplinary proceedings against Mr. ArgyrosKyriacou, Lay Worker (St. Haralambos’ Home for the Disabled), in the Department of Medical Services, for a number of serious offences allegedly committed by him.

In view of the nature of the offences and in order to facilitate the investigation, the Director-General, Ministry of Health, considers it expedient that the said officer should be interdicted under the provisions of Article 84(1) of Law No. 33/67.[*560]

In view of the investigation that has been directed against Mr. Kyriacou, the Commission decided that it is in the public interest that the officer in question should cease to exercise the powers and functions of his Office pending the investigation and until the final disposal of the case. The Commission further decided that Mr. Kyriacou should be interdicted from the exercise of the powers and functions of his Office as from the 23rd February, 1978.

During the period of his interdiction, Mr. Kyriacou will be allowed to receive one half of his emoluments”.

The Public Service Commission communicated their decision to the applicant by letter, on the same day (see Appendix 4), against which the applicant had filed no recourse.

Finally there were preferred against him 26 disciplinary charges and the hearing of the proceedings started on the 18th September, 1979. On the 24th September, 1979, the applicant was acquitted on charges 17 to 26 after leave was granted to counsel appearing for the Prosecuting Authority to withdraw same.

On the 5th October, 1979, counsel representing the applicant addressed a letter to the Public Service Commission asking on his behalf that, because of his acquittal on the said 10 charges, and as he believed that the reasons for which his client had been interdicted had ceased to exist, his interdiction ought to be terminated immediately. Copy of the above letter of counsel for the applicant is attached to the Opposition as Appendix 6.

The Public Service Commission, at its meeting of the 24th October, 1979, after taking into consideration applicant’s counsel letter and an advice of the Deputy Attorney-General on the matter, reached the conclusion not to terminate his interdiction before the final determination of the case. This decision, which was communicated to counsel for the applicant by letter dated the 31st October, 1979, is the subject of this recourse.

The decision reached by the Public Service Commission on the 24th October, 1979 and the letter addressed to counsel on the 31st October, 1979 are appended to my decision as Appendixes A and B.

Before proceeding any further, it is pertinent to examine,[*561]at this stage, one of the main submissions put forward by counsel for the respondents, namely that the sub judice decision is not of an executory nature, but a confirmatory one of their previous decision to interdict the applicant, which, as it is admitted, has not been challenged by recourse. With regard to the above submission of counsel for the respondents, learned counsel for the applicant has stressed that it is not the decision to interdict him that is challenged by this recourse, but the failure of the respondents to recognise that the applicant’s interdiction came to an end, in view of the developments which supervened during the disciplinary proceedings, namely the acquittal of the applicant on 10 out of the 26 charges preferred against him.

Under Article 146 of the Constitution this Court has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate finally on a recourse made to it on a complaint that the decision or act or omission of any organ authority or person exercising executive or administrative authority is contrary to any of the provisions of the Constitution or of any law or is made in excess or in abuse of powers vested in such organ or authority or person.

In the present case the question that arises for consideration is whether the sub judice act is one for which the applicant can avail himself of the jurisdiction of this Court. It is well known that not every act emanating from an administrative organ can be made the subject of a recourse but only those which are of an executory nature.

What is an executory act is defined in the following extract from the Conclusions from the Case-Law of the Council of State in Greece 1929-1959 at p. 237:-

“         εκείναι δι' ων δηλούται βούλησις διοικητικού οργάνου, αποσκοπούσα εις την παραγωγήν εννόμου αποτελέσματος έναντι των διοικούμενων και συνεπαγομένη την άμεσον εκτέλεσιν αυτής διά της διοικητικής οδού. Το κύριον στοιχείον της εννοίας της εκτελεστής πράξεως είναι η άμεσος παραγωγή έννομου αποτελέσματος, συνισταμένου εις την δημιουργίαν, τροποποίησιν ή κατάλυσιν νομικής καταστάσεως, ήτοι δικαιωμάτων και υποχρεώσεων διοικητικού χαρακτηρος παρά τοις διοικουμένοις”.

(“…those by which the will of the administrative organ is declared, intending the creation of a legal situation[*562]towards the subjects involving its direct execution by administrative means. The main element of the meaning of executory act is the direct creation of a legal result, consisting of the creation, amendment or abolition of a legal situation, i.e. rights and obligations of an administrative character by the subjects”).

Is it that in the present case the Public Service Commission have, by their decision not to terminate the interdiction of the applicant, created or produced a legal situation concerning the applicant and entailing its direct execution by administrative means?

What counsel asked, in the present case, was that, because of the acquittal of his client on 10 out of the 26 charges he was facing, his interdiction ought to be terminated. The remaining 16 charges pending then against him were for offences which are considered to be not only of a nature unbecoming for a civil servant, but, also, punishable by the Criminal Code, i.e. insults, assaults, unlawful possession of firearms and offences against public order.

These charges formed part of the original complaint of the Director General of the Ministry of Health on which the Public Service Commission based its decision for the interdiction of the applicant. Therefore, the decision of the Commission, after the letter of counsel for the applicant, not to terminate his interdiction, was not based on any new facts before it, and for this reason, such deci3ion can only be held to be a confirmatory and not an executory act and as such it cannot be made the subject of a recourse. If authority is required on this, see Economides v. The Republic, (1980) 3 C.L.R. 219, 223, 224 and the Conclusions, supra, where (at p. 240) the following are stated in this respect:

“Πράξεις βεβαιωτικαί. Απαραδέκτως προσβάλλονται δι' αιτήσεως ακυρώσεως, ως στερούμεναι εκτελεστού χαρακτήρος, αι βεβαιωτικαί πράξεις, ήτοι αι πράξεις αι έχουσαι το αυτό περιεχόμενον προς προεκδοθείσαν εκτελεστήν, επιβεβαιούσαι ταύτην, ανεξαρτήτως του αν εκδίδωνται αυτεπαγγέλτως ή τη αιτήσει του ενδιαφερομένου. Ούτω είναι βεβαιωτική η πράξις η συνιστώσα απλήν επανάληψιν προγενεστέρας, ή στηριζομένη επί της αυτής πραγματικής και νομικής βάσεως. Πράξις δηλούσα απλήν εμμονήν της [*563] Διοικήσεως εις προηκουμένην πράξιν, έστω και μη επαναλαμβάνουσα το περιεχόμενον ταύτης, αποτελεί επίσης βεβαιωτικήν πράξιν, ως λ.χ. η εμμονή εις προγενεστέραν άρνησιν. Ούτω εκρίθησαν βεβαιωτικαί πράξεις η άρνησις της Διοικήσεως όπως ανακαλέση προηγουμένην εκτελεστήν πραξιν, ή απόρριψις απλής ιεραρχικής προσφυγής ή αιτήσεως θεραπείας”.

(“Confirmatory acts. Unacceptably they are attacked by recourse for annulment, as lacking executory character, confirmatory acts i.e. acts which have the same contents with a pre-issued executory one, confirming same, irrespective of whether they are issued on the motion of the administration or on the application of the interested party. Thus confirmatory is an act which consists of a mere repetition of a previous one, based on the same factual and legal basis. An act stating a mere persistence of the administration to a previous act, even though it does not repeat its contents also constitutes a confirmatory act, as for instance the persistence to a previous refusal. Thus the refusal of the Administration to revoke a previous executory act, the dismissal of a simple hierarchical recourse or an application for relief were considered as confirmatory acts”).

In view of my above decision, I am of the opinion that there is no need to examine any other ground raised in these proceedings and, in the result, this recourse is dismissed with costs, if claimed.

Application dismissed with costs.

ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ Α

Πρακτικά της συνεδριάσεως της Επιτροπής

Δημοσίας Υπηρεσίας ημερομηνίας 24.10.79 –

9.15 π.μ.

Παρόντες:  Πρόεδρος:          Τ. Φάνος.

Μέλη:                   Α. Αναστασίου,

Γ. Λουκά,                                         Θ. Χρήστου,                                              Λ. Χριστοδούλου.

Γραμματεύς:       Κ. Χ. Μακρίδης.[*564]

1. Αίτησις κ. Αργυρού Κυριάκου, Εσωτερικού Διευθυντού Στέγης Αγίου Χαραλάμπους, εις το Τμήμα Ιατρικών Υπηρεσιών διά την άρσιν της διαθεσιμότητός του εν σχέσει με την πειθαρχικήν υπόθεσιν εναντίον του.

Ο Γενικός Διευθυντής του Υπουργείου Υγείας, ενεργών διά την αρμοδίαν αρχήν, δι' επιστολής του υπ' αρ. Υ.Υ.407/61/8 και ημερομηνίαν 21 Φεβρουαρίου, 1978, επληροφόρησε την Επιτροπήν Δημοσίας Υπηρεσίας ότι εναντίον του κ. Αργυρού Κυριάκου, Εσωτερικού Διευθυντού Στέγης Αγίου Χαραλάμπους, διετάχθη πειθαρχική έρευνα 'διά σωρείαν σοβαρών αδικημάτων τα οποία υπέβαλον οι ασθενείς και το προσωπικόν του Οίκου Αγίου Χαραλάμπους εις Λάρνακα'.

Εις την ιδίαν επιστολήν ούτος ανέφερεν ότι 'τα αδικήματα αυτά αναφέρονται εις εξυβρίσεις, εκφοβισμούς, ξυλοδαρμούς, ασέμνους επιθέσεις κατά των εργατριών, εξύβρισιν του εκλιπόντος Προέδρου της Δημοκρατίας Αρχιεπισκόπου Μακαρίου και άλλα' και εισηγήθη όπως, χάριν του δημοσίου συμφέροντος, ή Επιτροπή θέση τούτον εις διαθεσιμότητα μέχρι της τελικής συμπληρώσεως της υποθέσεως, δυνάμει του άρθρου 84 του περί Δημοσίας Υπηρεσίας Νόμου Αρ. 33/67.

Η Επιτροπή Δημοσίας Υπηρεσίας επελήφθη του εν λόγω θέματος κατά την συνεδρίαν της 22ας Φεβρουαρίου, 1978, και απεφάσισεν όπως ο κ. Κυριάκου τεθή εις διαθεσιμότητα, χάριν του δημοσίου συμφέροντος, από της 23ης Φεβρουαρίου, 1978 και μέχρι της τελικής συμπληρώσεως της υποθέσεως. Εις τον κ. Κυριάκου επετράπει όπως λαμβάνη το ήμισυ των απολαβών της θέσεώς του διαρκούσης της διαθεσιμότητός του.

Η ρηθείσα απόφασις της Επιτροπής εκοινοποιήθη προς τον εν λόγω υπάλληλον δι' επιστολής του Προέδρου αυτής υπ' αρ. Π. 9146 και ημερομηνίαν 22αν Φεβρουαρίου, 1978.

Την 27.4.1979 η αρμοδία αρχή διεβίβασε προς την Επιτροπήν διά τα περαιτέρω το υπό του Γενικού Εισαγγελέως διατυπωθέν κατηγορητήριον εναντίον του κ. Κυριάκου, εις το οποίον περιελήφθησαν πειθαρχικά αδικήματα σχετιζόμενα αμέσως με το πραξικόπημα καθώς και μεταγενέστερα τοιαύτα.

Η ακρόασις της εναντίον του κ. Κυριάκου πειθαρχικής υποθέσεως ήρξατο την 18.9.1978 βάσει του διατυπωθέντος κατηγορητηρίου, κατά την διάρκειαν δε αυτής, και συγκεκριμένως την 24.9.1979 [*565] ο Δικηγόρος της Κατηγορούσης Αρχής εζήτησε να του επιτραπή να αποσύρη τας Κατηγορίας 17-26. Η Επιτροπή επέτρεψε τούτο και κατά συνέπειαν ηθώωσε τον κατηγορούμενον εις τας κατηγορίας αυτάς.

Ο Δικηγόρος κ. Κ. Κληρίδης, ενεργών εκ μέρους του κ. Κυριάκου, δι' επιστολής του προς την Επιτροπήν ημερομηνίας 5.10.1979 ισχυρίσθη ότι ο πελάτης του ετέθη εις διαθεσιμότητα λόγω αποδιδομένης εις αυτόν διαπράξεως ωρισμένων πειθαρχικών παραπτωμάτων καθαρώς υπηρεσιακής φύσεως, τα οποία κατόπιν ερεύνης συμπεριλήφθησαν εις το κατηγορητήριον ως Κατηγορίαι 17-26.

Περαιτέρω εις την επιστολήν του ο κ. Κληρίδης υπεστήριξεν ότι, υπό το φως της αποσύρσεως των εν λόγω κατηγοριών υπό της Κατηγορούσης Αρχής και της αθωώσεως του κ. Κυριάκου εις αυτάς, οι λόγοι διά τους οποίους ούτος είχε τεθή εις διαθεσιμότητα υπό της Επιτροπής έχουν αρθή και εζήτησεν όπως η διαθεσιμότης του κ. Κυριάκου τερματισθή και επιτροπή εις αυτόν να λάβη το πλήρες ποσόν των απολαβών, τας οποίας θα ελάμβανεν εάν δεν ετίθετο εις διαθεσιμότητα.

Το θέμα ετέθη ενώπιον του Γενικού Εισαγγελέως, όστις εγνωμάτευσεν ότι τα γεγονότα της υποθέσεως δεν δικαιολογούν την άρσιν του μέτρου της διαθεσιμότητος εναντίον του κ. Αργυρού Κυριάκου, διά του λόγους τους οποίους αναφέρει εις τας επιστολάς του υπ' αρ. Γ.Ε. 115/1976/6 και ημερομ. 22ας και 23ης Οκτωβρίου, 1979.

Η Επιτροπή Δημοσίας Υπηρεσίας, αφού έλαβε σοβαρώς υπ' όψιν τας παραστάσεις του Δικηγόρου του κ. Κυριάκου, καθώς και την γνωμάτευσιν του Γενικού Εισαγγελέως της Δημοκρατίας, έκρινεν ότι:

(α) Τα αποδοθέντα εις τον κ. Αργυρόν Κυριάκου αδικήματα, διά τα οποία είχε διαταχθή πειθαρχική έρευνα εναντίον του και βάσει της οποίας ή Επιτροπή έθεσε τούτον εις διαθεσιμότητα, καλύπτουν πλην εκείνων διά τα οποία ηθωώθη διαρκούσης της εναντίον του πειθαρχικής υποθέσεως και άλλα, μεταξύ των οποίων περιλαμβάνονται και αι αποδιδόμεναι εις αυτόν δραστηριότητες, αίτινες σχετίζονται με το πραξικόμημα και αι οποίαι αποτελούν αντικείμενον κατηγοριών επί των οποίων η πειθαρχική υπόθεσις δεν έχει εισέτι συμπληρωθή. [*566]

(β) οι λόγοι και τα περιστατικά επι των οποίων εβασίσθη η διαθεσιμότης του κ. Κυριάκου δεν έχουν υποστή τοιαύτην διαφοροποίησιν ώστε να δικαιολογήται η άρσις του μέτρου της διαθεσιμότητος προ της τελικής συμπληρώσεως της πειθαρχικής υποθέσεως.

Εν προκειμένω η Επιτροπή επανεξήτασε μετά προσοχής τους λόγους διά τους οποίους ο εν λόγω υπάλληλος ετέθη εις διαθεσιμότητα και κατέληξεν εις το συμπέρασμα ότι το μέτρον τούτο ελήφθη τόσον προς τον σκοπόν παρεμποδίσεως επηρεασμού των μαρτύρων κατηγορίας όσον και δι' άλλους εξ ίσου σοβαρούς λόγους. Οι τοιούτοι λόγοι αφορούν εις την εργασίαν και τας ευθύνας του κ. Κυριάκου ως Εσωτερικού Διευθυντού του ιδρύματος Αγ. Χαράλαμπος. Η εξ αυτού ιεραρχική εξάρτησις του προσωπικού αφ' ενός και η μετ' αυτού σχέσις των τροφίμων του ιδρύματος αφ' ετέρου, ευλόγως τεκμαίρεται ότι έχουν δυσμενώς επηρεασθή λόγω της σοβαρότητας των αδικημάτων διά τα οποία ούτος κατηγορείται. Ή υπό του καθ ου η δίωξις άσκησις των καθηκόντων του εκκρεμούσης της εναντίον του πειθαρχικής υποθέσεως κρίνεται ότι θα απέβαινεν επιζημία διά την ομαλήν και απρόσκοπτον λειτουργίαν και εξυπηρέτησιν των σκοπών του ιδρύματος.

Έχουσα υπ' όψιν τα ανωτέρω, η Επιτροπή απεφάσισεν όπως μη τερματίση την διαθεσιμότητα του κ. Αργυρού Κυριάκου προ της τελεκής συμπληρώσεως της εναντίον του πειθαρχικής υποθέσεως".

"ΠΑΡΑΡΤΗΜΑ Β

Αρ. Φακ.: Π.9146/ΙΙΙ                                  ΓΡΑΦΕΙΟ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΗΣ

ΔΗΜΟΣΙΑΣ ΥΠΗΡΕΣΙΑΣ

ΛΕΥΚΩΣΙΑΣ

31 Οκτωβρίου, 1979.

Κύριε,

Έχω οδηγίες να αναφερθώ στην επιστολή σας με ημερ. 5 Οκτωβρίου, 1979, με την οποία ζητάτε τον τερματισμό της διαθεσιμότητας του πελάτη σας κ. Αργυρού Κυριάκου και να σας πληροφορήσω τα ακόλουθα:

2. Η Επιτροπή Δημοσίας Υπηρεσίας επιλήφθηκε του θέματος [*567] σε πρόσφατη συνεδρία της και έλαβε σοβαρά υπόψη τις παραστάσεις σας.

3. Η Επιτροπή έλαβε επίσης υπόψη και καθοδηγήθηκε στην απόφασή της από γνωμάτευση του Γενικού Εισαγγελέα της Δημοκρατίας.

4. Τα αποδοθέντα στον πελάτη σας αδικήματα για τα οποία είχε διαταχθεί πειθαρχική έρευνα εναντίον του, βάσει της οποίας η Επιτροπή Δημοσίας Υπηρεσίας τον έθεσε σε διαθεσιμότητα, καλύπτουν εκτός από εκείνα για τα οποία αθωώθηκε κατά τη διάρκεια της ακροάσεως της εναντίον του πειθαρχικής υποθέσεως και άλλα μεταξύ των οποίων περιλαμβάνονται και αποδιδόμενες σ' αυτόν δραστηριότητες πού σχετίζονται με το πραξικόπημα και που αποτελούν αντικείμενο κατηγοριών πάνω στις οποίες ή πειθαρχική υπόθεση δεν έχει ακόμη συμπληρωθεί.

5. Οι λόγοι και τα περιστατικά πάνω στα οποία βασίστηκε ή διαθεσιμότητα του πελάτη σας δεν έχουν υποστεί τέτοια διαφοροποίηση πού να δικαιολογείται ή άρση του μέτρου διαθεσιμότητας πριν από την τελική συμπλήρωση ολόκληρης της πειθαρχικής υποθέσεως εναντίον του.

6. Για τους πιο πάνω λόγους η Επιτροπή αποφάσισε να μην τερματίσει τη διαθεσιμότητα εναντίον του κ. Αργυρού Κυριάκου πριν από την τελική συμπλήρωση της πειθαρχικής υποθέσεως.

Με εκτίμηση,

(Υπ.) Κ. ΜΑΡΚΙΔΗΣ

Για Πρόεδρο

Επιτροπής Δημοσίας Υπηρεσίας.

Κύριο

Κ. Κληρίδη,

Δικηγόρο,

Ακίνητα Σιαντεκλαίρ,

Οδός Σοφούλη Αρ. 28,

Λευκωσία.

Κοιν.: Γεν. Διευθ. Υπ. Υγείας,

Διευθ. Τμ. Ιατρ. Υπηρεσιών,

Κο Αργυρό Κυριάκου,

Εσωτερικό Διευθυντή

Στέγης Αγ. Χαραλάμπους,

(Μέσω Δ.Τ.Ι.Υ.)" [*568]

(“Appendix A

Minutes of the meeting of the Public Service Commission dated 24.10.79-9.15 a.m.

Present: Chairman: T. Phanos

Members: A. Anastassiou

Y. Louca

Th. Christou

L. Christodoulou

Secretary: K. Ch. Makrides

1. Application by Mr. ArghyrosKyriacou, Internal Director of St. Charalambos Home in the Medical Department, for the termination of his interdiction regarding a disciplinary case against him.

The Director-General of the Ministry of Health, acting for the appropriate authority, by his letter No. M.H. 407/61/8 dated 21st February, 1978, informed the Public Service Commission that a disciplinary, investigation has been ordered against Mr. ArghyrosKyriacou, Internal Director of St. Charalambos Home, for a number of serious disciplinary offences which have been submitted by the patients and the personnel of St. Charalambos Home at Larnaca.

In the same letter he mentioned that ‘these offences refer to insults, intimidations, beatings, indecent assaults against female workers, insulting the late President of the Republic Archbishop Makarios and so on’ and submitted that, in the public interest, the Commission may interdict him until the final completion of the case, according, to section 84 of the Public Service Law No. 33/67.

The Public Service Commission considered the above matter at its meeting of 22nd February, 1978, and decided that Mr. Kyriacou be interdicted, in the public interest, from the 23rd February, 1978 until the final determination of the case. Mr. Kyriacou was allowed to receive ‘half of the emoluments of his post during his interdiction.[*569]

The said decision of the Commission was communicated to the said officer by a letter of its Chairman No. P. 9146 and dated 22nd February, 1978.

On the 27th April, 1979, the appropriate authority transmitted to the Commission for further action the charges formulated by the Attorney-General of the Republic against. Mr. Kyriacou, which included disciplinary offences which related directly with the coup d’etat and subsequent offences.

The hearing of the disciplinary case against Mr. Kyriacou started on 18.9.1979 on the basis of the formulated charges, and in the course of the hearing and precisely on 24.9.1979 Counsel of the prosecuting authority asked for leave to with-draw counts 17-26. The Commission allowed the withdrawal and consequently acquitted the accused on these counts.

Advocate Mr. C. Clerides, acting on behalf of Mr. Kyriacou, by a letter to the Commission dated 5.10.1979 alleged that his client has been interdicted due to the alleged commission by him of certain disciplinary offences of a purely official character, which after investigation were included in the charge as counts 17-26.

Mr. Clerides by his letter further contended that in the light of the withdrawal of the said counts by the prosecuting authority and the acquittal of Mr. Kyriacou, the reasons for which Mr. Kyriacou has been interdicted by the Commission have been removed and has asked that the interdiction of Mr. Kyriacou be terminated and that he be allowed to receive the full amount of his emoluments, which he would have received had he not been interdicted.

The matter was placed before the Attorney-General of the Republic who has advised that the facts of the case do not justify the termination of the interdiction of Mr. ArghyrosKyriacou for reasons which he referred to in his letters under No. A.G. 115/1976/6 dated 22nd and 23rd October, 1979.

The Public Service Commission having taken seriously the representations of Mr. Kyriacou’s advocate as well as the opinion of the Attorney-General of the Republic, decided that:

(a)The offences attributed to Mr. ArghyrosKyriacou, for which a disciplinary investigation was ordered[*570]and on which the Commission has interdicted him cover, besides those for which he was acquitted during the hearing of the disciplinary case against him, other offences among which are included those activities attributed to him which are connected with the coup d’etat and which are the subject of counts on which the disciplinary case has not as yet been completed.

(b)The reasons and circumstances on which the interdiction of Mr. Kyriacou has been based have not undergone such a change as to justify the removal of the measure of interdiction before the final determination of the case.

In this respect the Commission has re-examined carefully the reasons for which the said officer has been interdicted and has reached the conclusion that this measure has been taken both for the purpose of avoiding his tampering with prosecution witnesses and for other equally serious reasons. These reasons concern the work and the responsibilities of Mr. Kyriacou as internal Director of the St. Charalambos Home. The hierarchical dependency to him of the personnel on the one hand and the relationship of the inmates of the Home on the other hand can reasonably he presumed to have been prejudicially affected due to the gravity of the offences for which he is charged. The exercise by the respondent of his duties while the disciplinary case against him is pending is considered that it would be injurious to the smooth and unhindered functioning and the service of the purposes of the Home.

Having in mind all the above, the Commission decided not to terminate the interdiction of Mr. ArgyrosKyriacou before the final determination of the disciplinary case against him”).

No. P. 9146/111

(“Appendix B

THE OFFICE OF THEPUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

NICOSIA

31 October, 1979[*571]

Sir,

I am directed to refer to your letter dated 5 October, 1979, whereby you ask for the termination of the interdiction of your client Mr. ArghyrosKyriacou and to inform you the following:

2. The Public Service Commission considered the matter at a recent meeting and took seriously into consideration your representations.

3. The Commission took also into consideration and was guided in reaching its decision by the opinion of the Attorney-General of the Republic.

4. The attributed to your client offences for which a disciplinary investigation had been ordered against him, on the basis of which the Public Service Commission interdicted him, cover besides those for which he was acquitted during the hearing of the disciplinary case against him and others among which are included activities attributed to him which relate to the coup d’ etat and which are the subject of counts on which the disciplinary case has not as yet been completed.

5. The reasons and circumstances on which the interdiction of your client has been based have not undergone such a change as to justify the removal of the measure of interdiction before the final determination of the whole disciplinary case against him.

6. For the above reasons the Commission decided not to terminate the interdiction of Mr. ArgyrosKyriacou before the final determination of the disciplinary case.

With respect

(Sgd) K. Makrides

for Chairman

Public Service Commission

Mr. C. Clerides

Advocate

Nicosia)”.

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